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CRIMINAL LAW: IMPUTING INNOCENT PARTY'S
LETHAL ACT UNDER THE FELONY MURDER RULE
A RECURRING PROBLEM in criminal law is the breadth of coverage to
be given the felony murder rule. At common law a death occurring
in the course of a felony was chargeable to the felon as murder.1 Con-
stricted variations of that rule have now been adopted by statute or
through judicial construction in most jurisdictions.
The New York Court of Appeals in People v. Wood,2 a recent case
involving unusual facts, has limited the application of the rule. After
taking part in a tavern quarrel, defendant Wood seriously wounded
another participant with unprovoked pistol fire on the street outside.
When Wood began to flee, the tavern owner attempted to prevent his
escape and mortally wounded the driver of the get-away car and an
innocent bystander. Wood was charged with first degree murder on
the basis of New York's "felony murder" statute which provides, in
part, that "The killing of a human being . . . is murder in the first
degree, when committed by a person engaged in the commission of...
a felony . . . ."3 Aflirming the lower court's dismissal of the murder
indictment, the Court of Appeals held that the phrase "by a person
engaged in the commission of a felony" excluded cases where the homi-
cide was not immediately caused by the felon.
The New York statute is best analyzed when it is projected against
the common law and compared with corresponding legislative and ju-
dicial treatments of the felony murder rule. The nine felonies at com-
mon law4 were regarded as extremely heinous crimes, to be deterred
with strong sanctions. The felony murder rule was partially designed,
therefore, to discourage commission of the felonies themselves. The
fundamental reasons for creating this category of murder, however, were
that most of the felonies were more dangerous to human life than were
misdemeanors and that a felon who had created a foreseeable risk
4. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES § 201 (1770).
2 8 N.Y.zd 48, 267 N.E.zd 736, zo N.Y.S.zd 328 (296o). This is the first New
York decision on point, although dicta in previous cases indicated the court's position.
See People v. Udwin, z54 N.Y. 255, 172 N.E. 489 (1930); People v. Giro, 197 N.Y.
152, 90 N.E. 432 (IgIO).
'N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1044. [Emphasis added.]
"These felonies were felonious homicide, mayhem, arson, rape, robbery, burglary,
larceny, prison breach, and rescue of a felon. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 1o (1957).
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actually leading to death should be severely punished.' Since, in legal
theory, establishment of malice aforethought is requisite to a murder
conviction, courts have viewed the defendant's intent in committing the
felony as establishing fictionally his intent to cause death.,
The most sweeping modification of the common law has been the
restriction of the rule's application in order to eliminate felonies which
are not normally dangerous. In some jurisdictions this has been imple-
mented by means of statutes which operate only on specific felonious
crimes;j in others, the courts have imposed on the common law a "dan-
gerous felony" limitation." These limitations would seem to be founded
primarily in reaction to the increasing number and types of crimes made
felonies by statute. The increase in felonious crimes has necessitated
exclusion of these modern felonies if the felony murder rule is to find
its support in the foreseeability of harm notion.
The New York statute is unusual among those codifying some ver-
sion of the felony murder rule, since on its face it would be applicable to
any felony.'0 Moreover, the inclusion of the phrase "by a person en-
gaged in" is also a departure from most statutes." In interpreting the
Larceny was the one common law felony which might be said to involve a, lesser
degree of risk to human life. This is acknowledged in many modern statutes which do
not include larceny under the rule. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 53-9 (.958)
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (Supp. 196o) i LA. REV. STAT. § 14:30 (1950) i MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, §§ 408-10 (1957)5 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.316 (1948) i Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 559.010 (-953). Contra ARK. STAT. § 41-2205 (i947).
'See, e.g., People v. Luscomb, 29z N.Y. 390, 55 N.E.2d 469 (94.); Common-
wealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949); State v. King, 24 Utah 482,
68 Pac. 418 (1902).
Aside from actual intent, another category of malice aforethought was reckless
disregard for human life, as evidenced by an act probably causing death or grievous
harm. In utilizing the transfer theory, the courts often have associated the felony murder
rule with the "intent" category rather than with "probable death," which would seem
more akin. See generally PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 30 (1957).
'See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-9 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04
(Supp. 196o) 5 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 408-10 (1957) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-X7
(953).
'See, e.g., People v. Stuart, 47 Cal.2d 167, 302 P.2d S (1956)5 People v. Pavlic,
227 Mich. 562, 199 N.W. 373 (1924) 5 State v. Diamond, 16 NJ. Super. z6, 83 A.2d
799 (App. Div. .95i ) j State v. Streeton, 231 N.C. 301, 56 S.E.2d 649 (1949).
9 Other factors are (i) a growing reluctance to invoke the death penalty generally
and (z) doubt as to the effectiveness of felony murder as a deterrent to potential felons.
" Typical is the Florida provision, "The unlawful killing of a human being, . . . ,
when committed in the attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, abomi-
nable and detestable crime against nature or kidnapping, shall be murder in the first
degree, and shall be punishable by death." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (Supp. 196o).
" See statutes cited note 7 supra and the statute quoted note io supra.
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statute, the New York courts have formulated a "res gestae" rule, which
is enlightening with regard to cases in the Wood category because in-
dicative of their general approach to the statute. The effect of "res
gestae" is to exclude from the statute's operation cases where the fatal
injury was inflicted immediately before or after the felony. 2 Quite
possibly the "res gestae" restriction is motivated by a desire to amelio-
rate in some way an otherwise all-encompassing "any felony" statute.
However, if the justification for the felony murder rule is that of fore-
seeability, it is questionable whether the New York law can be made
consistent with this basis of the rule by interposing limitations which
have no relationship to foreseeability.
The crucial issue facing courts in these unusual" Cmnnocent trigger-
man" cases is whether the action of the felon was the legally respon-
sible cause of the death, since the criminal law will punish a defendant
only for those social harms which in legal contemplation were the result
of his actions. Many courts which refuse to hold the "innocent trigger-
man" responsible rely upon the proposition that one person's act can
be imputed to another only if it was done in furtherance of their common
purpose.14 Upon reflection, this approach to proximate cause based on
irrelevant principles of agency seems to be rather illogical. While the
Ccommon purpose" test may be appropriate for holding the felon for
the acts of his co-felon, to consider it exclusive is to take an unrealistic
attitude toward cause and responsibility. Certainly there is reason to
hold a man responsible for the consequences of actions which he was
instrumental in effecting.
Pennsylvania cases upholding convictionr' utilize proximate cause
tests common in tort law, where the concept is well developed. In this
view an intervening act which is a normal response to the situation
created by the felon's criminal conduct is not a superseding cause of the
harm which the felon's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing
about.' 6  The use of the proximate cause test in these unique Wood
"
5 People v. Lunse, 278 N.Y. 303, 16 N.E.zd 345 (938); People v. Ryan, 263 N.Y.
298, 189 N.E. 225 (1934) ; People v. Smith, 23z N.Y. 239, 133 N.E. 574 (19z).
"5 Fewer than thirty-five cases were found involving a prosecution under the felony
murder rule where the person performing the lethal act was not one of the felons.
14 See, e.g., People v. Garippo, 292 Ill. 293, 127 N.E. 75 (1920); Commonwealth
v. Moore, z21 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. io85 (19o5); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 7 Allen
541 (Mass. 1878); State v. Oxendine, x87 N.C. 658, 122 S.E. 568 (1924).
" Commonwealth v. Almeida, 36z Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (949); Commonwealth
v. Moyer, 357 Pa. x8S, 53 A.2d 736 (1947).
"o The use of a proximate cause approach is not a phenomenon of this narrow line
of cases, for it is used extensively in other areas of criminal law. For a discussion of
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situations under the felony murder rule draws an ambit of liability
coincidental with the lmits of the rule's basis, since both causation and
responsibility are posited on the foreseeability of grievous harm. It is
a commendable approach, therefore, which, if utilized, would bring a
more reasoned result.
In New York the causation problem is overshadowed by the statu-
tory provision which limits the operation of the felony murder rule to
a killing committed by the felon. The Wood case illustrates the court's
inclination to take a narrow view of that limitation. Since the court does
not follow the statute literally in cases where the felon is held for the
acts of his co-felon,1' it is arguable that the phrase might be read from
a proximate cause standpoint to hold the felon. Concededly, however,
the court is not open to serious attack in view of the general principle of
strictly interpreting criminal statutes. 8
In one important respect the New York statute is more in harmony
than most to the foreseeability basis of the rule. Since the statute is not
confined to enumerated felonies, if the courts were to read in a "dan-
gerous act" limitation, the basis and the rule would mesh perfectly in
cases where the felon himself has killed.' 9 This would produce a more
flexible arrangement in which the jury would determine whether there
was a foreseeability of death in the circumstances of the particular crime.
However, a philosophical inconsistency appears when the narrow "by a
person" clause is compared with the broad "any felony" clause. The
"by a person" language, as interpreted in the Wood case, precludes the
jury from considering foreseeability by employing a strict causal test
which has no relationship to foreseeability. Its arbitrary nature serves
only to widen the gap between principle and practice.
It may be true that the felony murder rule could be applied too
harshly. Yet, adherence to the foreseeability standard would adequately
handle difficult cases both where the lethal act was coincidental with the
felony and cases where it was extremely remote from the felony. Ad-
proximate cause in criminal law, see generally PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 615-50 (1957)
CLEMENTS, COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL LAW 310 (-952).
"People v. Ryan, z63 N.Y. 298, 189 N.E. 2z5 (1934)5 People v. Collins, 234
N.Y. 355, 137 N.E. 753 (192z) ; Ruloff v. People, 45 N.Y. 2-3 (1871).
"8 While this is an acknowledged rule of interpretation of criminal statutes, HALL,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 39 (zd ed. x96o), New York does allow
more latitude by virtue of a provision which expressly substitutes a "fair reading"
standard of judicial interpretation. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 21.
" Conceivably felony murder could be replaced by a test which would not be
restricted to felonies and would operate on misdemeanors committed in a dangerous
manner as well.
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mittedly, cases where the victim was the co-felon seem to call for tem-
perance, although a logical extension of the rule would cover even this
situation.20 In general, however, there seems to be no sufficient reason
for restricting the felony murder rule on the basis of the actor's identity
as was done by the New York court in People v. Wood.
20 In Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.zd 472 (1958), the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction of the felon who had killed his co-
felon. The court distinguished Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595
(x949), on the ground that Redline involved the "justifiable" killing of a felon, which
could not support a murder charge, while the "excusable" homicide in Alneida involved
the killing of an innocent bystander by an innocent intervener.
